hat if you could no longer believe what your robot assistant was telling you was the truth? Are there circumstances under which that would be acceptable? What if it was for your own good? The time of ro botic deception is rapidly approach ing. We are being bombarded re garding the inherent ethical dangers of the approaching robotics and AI revolution, but far less concern has been expressed about the potential for robots to deceive human beings.
Deception according to the Turing test for AI is a hallmark character istic of intelligence, and philoso phers such as Dennett [3] have stated "another price you pay for higher order intentionality is the opportu nity [for] … deception." Our working definition of deception (for which there are many) is "deception sim ply is a false communication that tends to benefit the communica tor" [1] . Several robotics research ers have considered the role of deception for both agent survival [4] and humanrobot interaction [8] , including our group.
We have successfully demonstrat ed the value of biologicallyinspired deception in four separate cases as applied to robotic systems: 1) pursuit evasion using interdependence theo ry when hiding from an enemy [12] ; 2) misdirection based on be ha vioral changes [6] ; 3) fei gning strength when it does not exist [2] , and 4) deception used for the ben efit of the mark [7] . The res ponse to our research at times has been quite strik ing, ranging from accolades (being listed as one of the top 50 inventions of 2010 by Time Magazine [9] to damnation ("In a stunning display of hubris, the men … detailed their foolhardy experiment to teach two robots how to play hideandseek" [10] , and "Researchers at the Georgia Insti tute of Technology may have made a terrible, terrible mistake: They've taught robots how to de ceive" [5] . This spectrum of res ponse is quite striking. Perhaps, it is where decep tion is used that is the hot button for this debate.
For military applications, it seems clear that deception is widely ac cepted. Sun Tzu in the Art of War said that "All warfare is based on deception," while Machiavelli in the Discourses stated to the effect that "Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable." Indeed, the U.S. Army [11] has a Field Manual on the subject.
The dangers outside of the mili tary are quite real. And of course, after its development, how is it en sured that it is only used in the con text it was designed for? Is there an inherent fundamental right, where by humans should not be lied to or deceived by robots? Kant's categori cal imperative clearly indicates that lying is fundamentally wrong, as is taught in most introductory ethics classes. But from a consequentialist point of view there are times when deception has societal value, even apart from the military (or adversar ial sports), perhaps in calming down a panicking individual in a search and rescue operation or in the man agement of patients with dementia, with the goal of enhancing that indi vidual's survival. In this case, even from a rightsbased approach, the intention is good, let alone from a utilitarian or consequentialist for mulation. But even then, does that warrant allowing a robot to possess such a capacity? The point here is not to argue that robotic deception is ethically justifiable or not, but rather to help generate discussion on the subject, and consider its ramifications. As of now there are absolutely no guide lines for researchers in this space, and it indeed may be the case that some should be created or imposed, either from within the robotics com munity or from external forces. In particular, the IEEE Global Initia tive on Ethics of Intelligent and Autonomous Systems is now con fronting these questions among many others. But the time is coming, if left unchecked, you may not be able to believe or trust your own intelligent devices. Is that what we want?
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